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18 November 1974

INTELLIGENCE PANEL OF THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP

Second Meeting, 1400 hours, 18 November 1974

Minutes

Members Present: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC
Mr. Paul Walsh, D/DDI/CIA
(for Mr. Edward Proctor DDI/CIA)
Mr. Richard Curl, INR/State
(for Mr. McAfee, DD/INR/State)
[redacted] NSA/CSS
Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., DD/DIA
[redacted] NIO
(for Mr. George Carver, D/DCI/NIO)
[redacted] (Ret), DCI/IC/CS
Executive Secretary for part of meeting
[redacted] DCI/IC/CS
Executive Secretary for part of meeting

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General Wilson said he had six items to raise.

Agenda Item 1: Minutes of the 25 October Meeting

All members concurred in the draft minutes. Responding to General Wilson's question, most members considered detailed minutes were appropriate for initial sessions of the Panel, but should become more terse over time. Mr. Curl and [redacted] requested that principal topics of discussion and action items be highlighted. Mr. Walsh considered the minutes useful as a means of indicating NSCIC activity.

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Agenda Item 2: Intelligence Warning

General Wilson reported he had received no comments in response to his request on the draft distributed 25 October. [redacted] and Tighe said their comments had been forwarded. Mr. Curl will check on the State response. General Wilson

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indicated he considered this paper posed a problem the Panel should involve itself with, and he would be in touch with the members after the comments had been reviewed.

Agenda Item 3: Congressional Action Relating to Intelligence

25X1 General Wilson provided members copies of a Memorandum for Record prepared by [] on this subject and reported it would be given NSCIC Working Group members on 20 November. This was for information only, and the Chairman said he would insure that arrangements would be made for any action papers to be distributed well before Panel meetings.

Agenda Item 4: Critique of Intelligence Product

Gen. Wilson said this would be the primary topic at the NSCIC Working Group meeting of 20 November and that at a minimum he hoped the session would provide "pump priming" for future actions.

Gen. Tighe said it is important to identify who the customer is and what he actually sees and absorbs. He mentioned one senior customer who said his intelligence support was excellent and would be outstanding if only he could articulate what it was he wanted.

Gen. Wilson cited Mr. Clement's comments that the Intelligence Community provided him "inadequate help." The Chairman asked for suggestions as to how user criticisms of a specific nature could be elicited. He said his goal was to have the Working Group develop 10 to 15 clear statements of what could be described as "intelligence deficiencies" on which action could be taken. If it turned out this could not be done he would not waste time pursuing the matter further, but he wanted, at a minimum, to document that an effort had been made to get intelligence users to focus on the problem.

Mr. Curl felt that policy-level consumers were generally not receptive to crisis post-mortems because it was "too much like finger pointing." He suggested the NSCIC needs a panel of representative users who would be responsible for producing judgments on selected intelligence products. This would pin responsibility on the users themselves and institutionalize product judgments. He considered the NSCIC could assign this responsibility, with the Working Group serving as the monitor.

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[] saw a need for an evaluation system which would involve users with requirements. This would promote an understanding that if requirements are added other requirements will have to be deleted.

Mr. Curl considered it was necessary to "shock" users into helping with respect to reductions in intelligence resources. He felt that if users were advised as to what would have to be eliminated in terms of products a serious response could be evoked. He suggested the Working Group be advised as to the impact of particular cuts in resources and be requested to assist in identifying choices, partly based on the impact reductions would have on the final intelligence product.

Gen. Wilson commented that using "market mechanisms" in intelligence production might prove helpful, i.e., what would particular users "buy" if it came out of their own budget instead of coming to them as a "free good." The "free good" situation does not push users toward any focus on choices.

Gen. Tighe again emphasized that the Community needed to know what consumers actually consume.

Mr. Walsh felt that to do this it was important to get to the key staff personnel who brief and summarize documents for senior policy makers.

Mr. Curl considered that the KIQ process encourages proliferation of requirements. [] again said that those who want to add new requirements should be forced to eliminate an equivalent number.

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[] suggested that a list of 12 "big topics" (such as the Middle East, Strategic Weapons, etc.) be drawn up and users asked to indicate where they considered intelligence support was weakest. From that starting point, users could then be pushed for specific criticisms. This would require the consumers to staff the problem and bring key staff personnel into the project.

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[] suggested the NIOs be involved in this process. He wondered whether the Working Group members were fully familiar with the KIQ/KEP process and with the role of the NIOs.

Gen. Wilson said that the Working Group must develop a sense of responsibility. Recognition that the Group must

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report to the NSCIC should lead them to do their homework properly. He thought that the 20 November meeting might be only the first of several needed to bring out a full response.

He noted that there had been discussion at the 25 October meeting about Panel members attending the Working Group session to hear the criticisms expressed, but he did not consider this appropriate since it might inhibit discussion. He said he would raise the matter of Panel attendance with the Group at a later time.

Gen. Tighe said it would be interesting to note how the level of attendance at the Working Group is maintained.

Agenda Item 5: "The Fact of" Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance

Gen. Wilson reported on the Working Group action, opposing declassification, and his memorandum to the NSCIC Chairman. No further action will be required until Mr. Colby has again discussed his position at the NSCIC level.

The Chairman advised the Panel of a possible problem which may arise from an unclassified Murphy Commission paper which discusses satellite reconnaissance. He said the DCI would have to deal with this problem, and that at the present he had three options - (1) ignore it, which has obvious disadvantages (2) confront the Commission head-on and insist on deletion of the references, or (3) endeavor to reach a reasonable compromise by rewording of the paper. Several members indicated interest in the problem and offered any help their agencies might provide.

Agenda Item 6: Minutes of the 30 October Working Group Meeting

Gen. Wilson asked if any Panel members had identified follow-on actions.

25X1 [] said he saw nothing wrong with referring the "Perspectives" to consumers for comment, providing it did not become a coordination exercise. He felt that the number of KIQs should be kept to the absolute minimum. Mr. Walsh said that expanding the KIQ list would kill it, and Gen. Wilson agreed. Mr. Curl thought the Working Group should be made aware of the KIQ evaluation process.

The matter of customer satisfaction in crisis situations poses special problems in the SIGINT field, [] said, since the volume of SIGINT skyrockets. Any attempt to search out and analyze the "gold nuggets" in this increased

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
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volume of material requires additional resources and transfer of analysts from other works, which NSA may not be able to afford.

Mr. Walsh felt that assigning the Omnibus NSCID to the Working Group to prepare a recommendation was a "convoluted route" to the NSCIC, but Gen. Wilson pointed out that this was what the NSCIC had directed.

Gen. Wilson closed the session with a comment that he still was not certain whether papers could move from the Panel directly to the NSCIC or would have to go through the Working Group. He felt it was possible the Panel would be able to achieve considerable autonomy.



Director, Coordination Staff

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